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FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION AS WAR,
PART THREE: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY
Michael J. Gerhardt*
I. INTRODUCTION
The immediate backdrop for this symposium leaves no doubt about
federal judicial selection as war. Over the past year, Democrats and
Republicans on the Senate Judiciary Committee have frequently
experienced conflict over the appropriate bases for choosing judicial
nominees and evaluating the merits of their nominations in the
confirmation process. These conflicts were especially apparent when the
Senate Judiciary Committee, not once but twice, in relatively short
order, rejected President Bush's nominees to federal courts of appeal.1 In
neither case was it obvious that the nominee lacked the credentials for
elevation. The first rejected nominee was Charles Pickering, a federal
district judge in Mississippi, while the second was Priscilla Owen, an
associate justice of the Texas Supreme Court. In each case, the
nominee's ideology was cited as a basis for his or her rejection, 2 and in
. Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. In this as well
as other works on federal judicial selection, I owe a special debt of gratitude for the
pioneering work done by Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, and Carl Tobias.
I am honored to participate in Regent University Law School's special program on
the role of ideology in federal judicial selection. I am particularly flattered and appreciative
to be in the company of two veteran commentators and participants in the process, Roger
Pilon and Thomas Jipping.
My speech today is the third in a series of commentaries on federal judicial selection
as war. In my first speech on this topic, I focused on the selection of Supreme Court justices
as war. In the second, I examined the selection of lower court judges as war. This third
speech has a lot in common with my second. I intend still to look at lower court judicial
appointments as war, but today I do so with special emphasis on how ideology has
triggered (or helped to contribute) to conflict in the process.
As I have crisscrossed the country over the past year to speak on federal judicial
selection as war, I have been struck by the realization that I appear to be among the last of
a dying breed. I think of myself as a moderate, but there seem to be few moderates on the
question of how federal judicial selection should proceed. So, it is fitting today that I am
sandwiched between Roger and Tom, where my moderate views can be easily crushed
between their very forceful arguments. Nevertheless, I hope there is much common ground
among us. My intention is less to point out anything wrong in their visions of the process
but rather to provide a slightly different framework with which to analyze the propriety or
legitimacy of current activity in the judicial selection process, a framework that I hope can
be used for putting all of our comments into historical perspective.
1 Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Reject Bush Pick in Battle Over Court Balance, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2000, at Al.
2 Id.; Helen Dewar, Senate Panel Rejects Bush Appointee, WASH. POST, Sept. 6,
2002, at A01.
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each case, the coverage of the process emphasized that the activity was
part of a battle over the future of the federal judiciary. 3
The Senate Judiciary Committee's rejections of these two
nominations seem to confirm the threat made at the outset of George W.
Bush's presidency by some prominent Democratic senators, strategists,
and commentators. The threat was that there would be a "war" if, after
the Supreme Court's controversial opinion in Bush v. Gore4 short-
circuiting Vice-President Gore's challenge to the vote count in Florida
and effectively awarding the presidency to him, Bush tried to claim a
mandate to nominate conservative ideologues outside of the mainstream
of constitutional jurisprudence. 5 After September 11, 2001, some
Republican senators and administration officials suggested, however,
that the war against terrorism obliges senators (and others) to give the
President's judicial nominees special deference to facilitate domestic
tranquility and ensure a fully staffed judiciary available to properly
monitor and process criminal proceedings coming out of the war against
terrorism. 6 They explained further that the President's judicial
nominations generally require substantial deference so that they do not
divert the precious time and political capital President Bush needs to
wage the war effort successfully. Still others maintained that, apart from
the war on terrorism, the President's judicial nominees deserve more
respect in the process than they are getting; at the very least, they
deserve hearings and final votes on their nominations by the entire
Senate. This argument is especially true for President Bush's judicial
nominees because, in their supporters' judgment, they have had stellar
legal careers, and the only plausible basis for their rejection is not a lack
of qualifications but rather hostility to their (suspected) ideologies.
The most serious problem with these arguments is that the
structure of the Constitution is plainly designed to invite conflict.7
Anyone familiar with the process of judicial selection knows just how
3 Dewar, supra note 2; Lewis, supra note 1.
4 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
5 See, e.g., Should Ideology Matter? Judicial Nominations 2001, Hearing of the
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. (2001) (prepared statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of
Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/te062601tri.htm (June 26, 2001); Thomas B. Edsall,
Ashcroft Will Face a Grilling in Senate; ights Looming on Judicial Choices, WASH. POST,
Dec. 25, 2000, at A01; Robin Toner, Interest Groups Set for Battle on a Supreme Court
Vacancy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2001, at Al.
6 See, e.g., Rehnquist Calls on Senate to Step Up Pace of Judicial Confirmations,
BULL. FRONTRUNNER, Jan. 2, 2002; Linda Gasparello, Cheney to Senate: Set Judges Free
(64 of Them), 29 WHITE HOUSE WKLY. 223 (Nov. 20, 2001).
7 See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORIcAL ANALYSIS (2000) [hereinafter FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS].
[Vol. 15:15
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combative and vitriolic contests over judicial appointments can be.
Though not always short, their nastiness and brutality seem otherwise
to exemplify the infamous conditions Thomas Hobbes had described as
existing within the state of nature.8 The structure of the Constitution
pits presidents and senators against each other in the federal
appointments process, and the framers fully expected, even hoped, that
conflicts would ensue from this design.9 Their expectation was that the
checks and balances of the Constitution, including the distribution of
authority on judicial appointments, were designed, in Madison's famous
phrasing, so that "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."10 The
framers viewed conflicts as inevitable and even desirable, as each branch
sought to aggrandize its powers at the expense of the other. The ensuing
friction would prevent one branch from becoming tyrannical.
Yet, the structure of the Constitution invites not only conflicts, but
also accommodations. In relatively short order, presidents and senators
developed informal accommodations or informal arrangements to reduce
the inevitability of conflict and yet preserve some realm of discretion
with respect to judicial appointments. These accommodations,
expectations, or arrangements are called institutional norms."1
Following the institutional norms applicable to federal judicial selection
generally produces peaceful coexistence between presidents and senators
rather than sanctions.
Hostilities break out in the process for selecting lower-court judges
when the governing institutional norms are in flux or when the
President, senators, nominees, or all of these violate long-standing
practices or expectations (some, but not all, of which constitute
institutional norms). This basic dynamic persists regardless of whether
the nation is at war.' 2 History generally suggests that judicial
appointments entail a give-and-take in which presidents and senators
tussle or negotiate over their respective achievements of various short-
and sometimes long-term objectives. How well presidents and senators
achieve their respective objectives and discharge their all-important
duties relating to judicial selection depends on their compliance with and
coordination of the governing institutional norms and on expectations at
the times appointments must be made. Presidents and senators
obviously do not perform in a vacuum; context is all-important, but
context does not guarantee particular outcomes. The fact that the nation
8 THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 65 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1651).
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
10 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
11 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal
Appointments Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687 (2001) [hereinafter Norm Theory].
12 For some prior discussions of this view, see FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS,
supra note 7; Norm Theory, supra note 11.
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is at war is, of course, an important part of the context of present times,
but it does not - and likely will not - make a difference to the process of
judicial selection. A judicial appointment offers an opportunity both to
presidents and to at least some senators. But presidents and senators
are likely to view this opportunity differently depending on their
respective calculations of their short- and long-term needs. The context
in which they make their calculations includes not just war, but also the
persistent or perennial needs (or impulses) for both presidents and
senators, particularly from the opposition party, to reward friends,
penalize foes, influence the direction of the lower court(s), and effectuate
trading or deals to facilitate other legislative priorities or objectives.
My purpose is not to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate some
significant patterns in the selection of federal district and courts of
appeals judges. Part II will clarify some basic terminology, discuss the
relevance of statistics, and identify some of the basic institutional norms
applicable to federal judicial selection. These norms include, among
others, senatorial courtesy (easily the most robust of all the norms,
including deference to either senators who have been nominated as
judges, or to nominees preferred by the senators from the President's
party); good faith consultation with the Senate, nominees' fitting the
basic ethical and professional expectations of the times, making timely
nominations, substantial senatorial discretion in pacing the confirmation
process, following (or at least not altering) basic vetting procedures
(including but not limited to allowing, until recently, the American Bar
Association to formally rate prospective judicial nominees); and
responsible rhetoric in framing the terms of initial debate.
With this general framework in mind, Part III will focus on conflicts
between senators and presidents who have failed to adequately heed or
account for a relatively robust institutional norm, long-standing practice,
or expectation regarding judicial selection. These conflicts have followed
two patterns. The first has involved presidents' attempts to re-shape
some basic practices or procedures relating to judicial selection. Perhaps
the most serious battle now occurring within the judicial appointments
process is to develop a new norm or understanding regarding the
requisite ideology for a judge. The second category of conflicts consists of
presidents' failures to follow the governing norms in filling specific
vacancies. The reasons for these failures have been varied, including, but
not limited to, presidents' over-confidence or negligence, competing
priorities, and payback.
Part IV consists of models of accommodation. The first is
capitulation or presidential abdication of authority, as reflected
throughout most of the nineteenth century and in this century and
epitomized by the Harding administration. The second model consists of
an overview of the strategies employed by presidents and senators to
[Vol. 15:15
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achieve their respective objectives through negotiation or management
of various institutional norms. This second model also encompasses the
practices relating to appointing judges in the midst of war. As illustrated
by a review of several wartime presidents, including Abraham Lincoln,
Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon, presidents
have been able to achieve relatively conflict-free confirmation
proceedings for judicial nominees in the midst of war when they, rather
than the Senate, have been willing to bend or compromise in defining the
terms for judicial selection.
II. TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT
A few introductory clarifications are in order. First, the following
models reflect an important dynamic in the selection process. They are
premised on the unusual power and opportunity that presidents have to
set the terms of debate in a confirmation proceeding. Senators have more
limited, though significant, power to set or influence the agenda in a
confirmation proceeding because they are largely confined in the process
to a defensive posture. In structural terms, senators face the structural
disadvantage of being in a defensive posture throughout almost the
entirety of the appointments process. 13 Senators have tried to
compensate for their structural disadvantage through various means,
including the development of various procedures and norms to facilitate
the influence and input of individual senators, as well as the Judiciary
Committee leadership, on judicial appointments.
Second, the basic terms of war and norms need to be defined.
Neither definition will rely on strict terms of art. The terms "battle" and
"war" will be used loosely, despite the important differences between
them. It is useful to keep in mind that a contest over a particular judicial
nomination is more like a battle than a war, for it generally reflects or is
waged against a backdrop of larger contests among national political
leaders. One important mechanism in these battles consists of
institutional norms, which are the informal understandings or
arrangements among the leadership of national institutions developed
over time and deviations from which often trigger sanctions or
disapproval.14
Third, it is very important to recognize the institutional norms
applicable to the process of selecting lower court judges. The first and
most robust of these is senatorial courtesy. Senatorial courtesy takes at
least two forms in the appointments process. 15 The first is the deference
13 See John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633 (1993).
14 Norm Theory, supra note 11, at 1688-89.
15 For a general discussion, see FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 7, at
143-53.
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usually, but admittedly not always, given by senators to the nomination
of a colleague to a federal judgeship. The Senate confirmed all six
senators nominated to the Court in the twentieth century: Edward
Douglass White as Chief Justice, and as Associate Justices, George
Sutherland, Hugo Black, Jimmy Byrnes, Harold Burton, and Sherman
Minton. 16 While presidents have generally succeeded in nominating
many former members of Congress, particularly from the House, to
lower federal courts, 17 only two of these nominees were senators. In both
cases - Truman's nomination of Sherman Minton to the Seventh Circuit
and Ronald Reagan's nomination of James Buckley to the District of
Columbia Circuit - the Senate overwhelmingly confirmed the
nominees.18 The second form of senatorial courtesy is the deference given
by presidents to the choices of the senators from their parties for filling
vacant federal judgeships in their respective states. I examine conflicts
arising from breaches of this norm in more detail in the next part.
A second, significant norm is presidents' and senators' recognition of
the importance of nominating people from their parties to lower-court
judgeships. In the nineteenth century, party affiliation increasingly
became a useful proxy and demonstration of a nominee's fidelity to a
president's, or key senators', preferred constitutional ideology and policy
views. Kermit Hall's excellent study of nineteenth-century lower-court
judicial appointments demonstrates the increasing importance of
partisanship in judicial appointments. 19 For instance, all of Grover
Cleveland's lower-court appointees were Democrats. 20 The statistical
breakdown of the party affiliations for modern presidents' appointees to
lower courts reflects similar degrees of significance of partisanship in
their selection, including Franklin Roosevelt (98.5% for district judges
and 96% for circuit judges), Harry Truman (93.8% for district judges and
88.5% for circuit judges), Dwight Eisenhower (95.2% for district judges
and 93.3% for circuit judges), John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson
(92.1% for district judges and 95.1% for circuit judges), Richard Nixon
and Gerald Ford (89.6% for district judges and 93.0% for circuit judges),
Jimmy Carter (90.6% for district judges and 82.1% for circuit judges),
16 SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY (Melvin J. Urofsky ed.,
1994). Even people who have served in the House seem to have had their nominations
receive substantial deference from the Senate. In the twentieth century, the former House
members successfully nominated to the Court include William Moody as Associate Justice
and Fred Vinson as Chief Justice. Id.
17 See FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 7, at 129-30.
18 Paul A. Freund, Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process: Appointment
of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1146, 1161 (1988); James
Buckley Confirmed as Federal Appeals Judge, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1985, at 33.
19 KERMIT HALL, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE (1979).
20 FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 7, at 129-30.
[Vol. 15:15
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Ronald Reagan (91.7% for district judges and 96.2% for circuit judges), 21
George H.W. Bush (88.5% for district judges and 89.2% for circuit
judges), 22 and Bill Clinton (87.5% for district judges and 85.2% for circuit
judges).23 Moreover, Sheldon Goldman calculates striking statistics to
demonstrate the extent or percentage of a president's judicial
appointments based on a "partisan agenda" or made "to shore up
political support for the president or for the party."24 According to
Goldman, presidents from Truman through Clinton had percentages of
circuit appointments made on the bases of partisan agendas ranging
from a high of 100% for President Ford to a low of 25% for President
Reagan, with every other president above 70%.25
There are several other institutional norms applicable to federal
judicial selection. These norms include good faith consultation with the
Senate; nominating people who satisfy prevailing ethical and
professional expectations of the times; 26 responsible or credible rhetoric
in characterizing nominees' credentials; 27 timing; and basic procedures
for vetting and processing judicial nominations, including ratings of the
quality of judicial nominees by the American Bar Association, a practice
21 SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 348, 355 (1997).
22 Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE
282, 292-95 (1993) [hereinafter Bush's Judicial Legacy].
23 Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84
JUDICATURE 228, 245, 251 (2001) [hereinafter Clinton's Judges].
24 GOLDMAN, supra note 21, at 3.
25 See id. at 78, 130, 172, 208, 259, 307 (respectively, Truman, Eisenhower,
Kennedy & Johnson, Nixon & Ford, Carter, Reagan); Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note
22, at 285-86; Clinton's Judges, supra note 23, at 229-31.
26 In his exhaustive study of federal judicial selection from Franklin Roosevelt
through Reagan, Professor Goldman characterizes this norm as "the expectation that the
president and his administration will ordinarily choose persons who have the education,
experience, temperament, and reputation of legal acumen and integrity requisite for
judicial office." GOLDMAN, supra note 21, at 4.
27 This institutional norm is especially evident in Supreme Court selection. See
Michael J. Gerhardt, Supreme Court Selection as War, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 393 (2002). It is
often the case that each side in a judicial confirmation contest attempts to demonize the
other. The objective of the supporters of a nomination has been to demonize people who
oppose the nomination, while the opponents of a nomination have tended to demonize the
nominee. Interestingly, the efforts to demonize opposition track the rhetoric employed in
times of war. A recent headline in The New York Times suggestively reads, "A Nation
Defines Itself by its Evil Enemies." Robert F. Worth, A Nation Defines Itself by its Evil
Enemies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, § 4, at 1. The article suggests that in a war national
leaders tend to rally support by demonizing the enemy. Id. The same holds true in judicial
confirmation proceedings in which the contending sides follow a similar strategy. Bork was
famously characterized as well outside the mainstream, while a series of successful
nominees have been defended as moderate or principled conservatives in the great
tradition of justices whom most senators are thought to admire and want nominees to
resemble.
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that started with Truman.28 In the next two parts, I explore the
significance of breaches of these norms.
III. MODELS OF WAR
This Part surveys two basic models of conflict in lower-court judicial
selection. In turn, I consider warrior presidents who have invited conflict
and other presidents who have ignored or discounted appointments
norms at their own or their judicial nominees' peril.
A The Warrior Presidents
In the classic The Art of War, Sun Tzu makes two trenchant
observations that one might imagine would resonate with most
presidents in making Supreme Court nominations. The first observation
is, "To win without fighting is best."29 The other observation is, "The side
that knows when to fight and when not will take the victory. There are
roadways not to be traveled, armies not to be attacked, walled cities not
to be assaulted."30 One has to wonder why any president would disregard
either of these observations, but many seem to have done just that. So
one obvious question with which to begin an analysis of the models of
conflict within federal judicial selection is why presidents sometimes
welcome fights. That some welcome contests is beyond any doubt. I refer
to such presidents as the warrior presidents. These are the presidents
who have deliberately taken approaches that have provoked conflict with
the Senate. The warrior presidents in American history seem to have
had at least one important thing in common: they have invited heated
conflicts over nominees for the sake of either fortifying their prerogatives
or reshaping the basic institutional norms in the federal appointments
process.
The most devastating defeats warrior presidents have had in the
judicial selection process have involved their direct attacks to weaken or
alter senatorial courtesy. At least three presidents, upon taking office,
immediately set their sights on challenging senatorial courtesy in lower-
court judicial appointments. All three - Ulysses Grant, Herbert Hoover,
and Jimmy Carter - paid enormous prices, particularly within their own
parties, for their boldness.
Grant's first Attorney General, Ebenezer Hoar, angered Republican
senators by refusing to grant them carte blanche in their
recommendations for federal judges in their respective states; he insisted
28 Shortly after taking office, President George W. Bush discontinued the policy.
Robert S. Greenberger, ABA Loses Major Role in Judge Screening, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23,
2001, at B8.
29 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR ch. vii (Thomas Cleary trans. 1988).
30 Id. at ch. viii.
[VoL 15:15
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instead on higher standards for judicial nominees, and many senators
balked.3 1 This insistence eroded good will between many senators and
the White House, and in the end, it cost Grant and Hoar dearly when the
Senate refused to confirm Hoar's nomination as an Associate Justice as
retaliation for Hoar's conduct as Attorney General.
Interestingly, Herbert Hoover tried to follow a similar path as
Grant almost immediately after taking office in 1928. President Hoover
wanted to end patronage appointments, particularly to the federal
courts. Shortly after his inauguration, he released a statement that he
intended to end the practice of awarding judicial appointments based
solely on patronage and instead planned to raise the standards and
requisite qualifications for judicial appointments.3 2 As Sheldon Goldman
observes, "Herbert Hoover, with the aid of his Attorney General, William
Mitchell, attempted to break the grip that Republican senators had on
lower-court appointments in order to improve the quality of the
appointees. This resulted in several battles with Republican senators
and ultimately in an administration retreat."33 The retreat was only part
of the bigger story, for the battles helped to erode Hoover's relations with
his fellow Republicans in the Senate. He increasingly lost influence over
both domestic policy and Supreme Court appointments. Before the end of
his single term as president, he found himself at the other extreme from
which he started and acquiesced to the Senate's preferred candidate to
replace Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.34
In 1976, Jimmy Carter won the presidency based in part on his
pledge to base high-level appointments on merit rather than patronage.3 5
Fulfilling his pledge required, inter alia, challenging senatorial courtesy
for the sake of improving the quality and diversity of judicial
appointments. He tried, through legislation, executive orders, and
negotiations to have merit-select commissions established that would
recommend, either to senators or to him, a slate of qualified persons for
each judicial vacancy.36 Over time, serious friction developed between
Carter and various senators within his own party over their willingness
to follow his criteria in recommending candidates for various judgeships.
Tension also developed within the administration over the priorities for,
and means to achieve, administration objectives. It hardly helped that
Carter's chief rival for leadership of his party, Ted Kennedy, chaired the
Judiciary Committee and used his powers as chairman to try to
31 JOSEPH HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 74-75 (1953).
32 FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 7, at 146.
33 GOLDMAN, supra note 21, at 9.
34 See HARRIS, supra note 31, at 115-32.
35 GOLDMAN, supra note 21, at 238.
36 Id.
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implement new norms for judicial selection and in some instances to
thwart or embarrass Carter.37 While President Carter succeeded in
appointing unprecedented numbers of women and minorities as federal
district and appellate judges,3 8 his success came at the enormous cost of
fractured relations with senators from his own party.
In two other instances, presidents have challenged some basic
procedures, other than senatorial courtesy, for appointing judges. The
first involved President George H.W. Bush's frustration over the Senate
Judiciary Committee's access to FBI reports. 39 Just as the Judiciary
Committee was preparing to send Clarence Thomas' nomination as an
Associate Justice to the full Senate for final consideration, the Judiciary
Committee leaked Anita Hill's affidavit to the Justice Department. This
leak led to an embarrassing turnaround by the Committee to reopen its
hearings on Thomas, including its calling Hill and recalling Thomas in
dramatic, televised appearances before the Committee to address her
sexual harassment charges against him. Though the Senate ultimately
confirmed Thomas by an extremely close vote, 40 President Bush
announced shortly after the final vote that he had issued an order
restricting the Committee's future access to FBI reports. The order
provoked an impasse that lasted for three months while the Committee
refused to process any pending judicial nominations, until it could
arrange for its own investigation of the backgrounds of nominees to
substitute for the FBI reports. After three months, the administration
changed course by restoring access for Committee members and staff to
FBI reports, but with a stricter accounting of who would be allowed to
read the reports. The delay was fatal to over two dozen judicial
nominations made after the impasse, because their earliest opportunities
for hearings would not be until 1992, during which time the process
slowed down almost to a complete standstill pending the outcome of the
presidential election.
More recently, President Bush's son, George W. Bush, openly
challenged a different procedure. Shortly after taking office, President
George W. Bush's White House Counsel announced the administration's
intentions to curtail the practice of using the American Bar Association
to pre-screen possible judicial nominees; the practice began in 1946 and
extended through the end of the Clinton administration. 41 Ever since the
ABA gave a mixed rating to Robert Bork in his confirmation hearings,
many Republicans had questioned the organization's claim that its
37 Id. at 261-63.
3 Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 137, 141-
42 (1995).
39 Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 22, at 283-84.
40 Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969, 970 (1992).
41 See Norm Theory, supra note 11, at 1712-13.
[Vol. 15:15
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ratings are based on professional credentials and not to some extent on
the ideology of judicial nominees. In 1997, Senator Orrin Hatch, then the
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, concluded that these questions
had sufficient merit to justify abandoning the ABA's privileged status in
testifying about the quality of judicial nominees. 42 Despite this edict,
President Clinton continued to consult informally with the ABA prior to
making his judicial nominations. President Bush's decision to deny the
ABA any privileged status in rating nominees provoked criticism from
many Democratic senators. After regaining control of the Senate in May
2001, they retaliated by slowing down all pending judicial nominations
to provide the ABA with the opportunity to rate the quality of the
President's nominees. 43 President Bush has been able to move faster
than his predecessors in making judicial nominations because his staff
has not had to wait for the ABA to rate prospective nominees prior to
their formal nominations. However, his nominees have each had to wait
roughly six weeks after having been nominated to allow the ABA
sufficient time to rate their judicial qualifications for the Democrats on
the Judiciary Committee.
Beyond the challenges that the Bushes have made to certain
procedures in judicial selection, they joined President Reagan in
attempting to establish a new, or evolving, norm of judicial selection.44
Beginning with President Eisenhower, but with increasing emphasis
from the Carter through the current Bush administrations - with the
possible exception of Bill Clinton's presidency - presidents have
considered a person's likely ideology as an important factor in their
nomination as a federal judge.45 Moreover, during this same period, one
42 Richard Barbieri, Don't Muzzle the ABA on Judicial Nominees, THE RECORDER,
Feb. 21, 1997, at 4.
43 See Constitution Project, New Data from Constitutional Project Show Increased
Delays in Filling Federal Judgeships, available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/ci/
press.release_fedcourtupd.htm (Mar. 6, 2002) (indicating that judicial nominations have
slowed down both to allow for ABA input on pending nominations and to address anti-
terrorist legislation in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United
States).
44 Yet another norm to evolve over the past few decades is prior judicial experience
as a prerequisite for being nominated to the Supreme Court. See Lee Epstein et al., The
Norm of Prior Judicial Experience, 91 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2003).
45 See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 191 (1999)
(suggesting President Eisenhower may have helped to create the norm of prior judicial
experience as an indispensable criterion for nomination the Court because of the belief that
an examination of a nominee's record as a lower court judge would "provide an inkling of
his philosophy") (quoting Eisenhower); John R. Schmidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme
Court: A Collective Portrait, 3 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 1, 41 (1959) (claiming that "[i]t may be
properly suspected that those who urge [the perpetuation of the norm of prior judicial
experience] consciously or subconsciously assume that 'good' judges are those who are apt
to render decisions in accordance with [their] ideological predilections . . ."); DAVID M.
O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 57 (5th ed. 2000)
2002]
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of the most common reasons for opposing judicial nominees has been
doubt about or opposition to their likely judicial ideologies.46 The
extremely low percentage of President Reagan's appellate court
nominees made on the basis of partisan considerations reflects his
administration's inordinate emphasis on ideology as an indispensable
criterion for appointment.47 With this emphasis, the Reagan
administration helped to enshrine within the modern era an approach to
judicial selection that effectively counted a candidate's likely ideology as
an indispensable qualification for his or her appointment as a judge.
Subsequent Republican administrations have tried to give ideology a
similar degree of emphasis in the nomination process. And the vast
majority of President Clinton's judicial nominees who experienced
substantial or fatal delays in confirmation proceedings, as well as the
one judicial nomination made by President Clinton rejected by the
Senate - Ronnie White - had their nominations opposed because of
Republican senators' distrust of their likely ideologies. 4
Both the Senate Judiciary Committee's rejections of Judges Charles
Pickering and Priscilla Owen and the slow pace of judicial confirmation
proceedings reflect Democrats' concerns not just for payback but also for
opposing what they regard as extreme or outside-of-the-mainstream
judicial ideologies. The ensuing focus of both sides on judicial nominees'
likely ideologies reflects an important dynamic in judicial selection in
which, in effect, Republicans and Democrats are vying to define or
control the formation of a new norm to govern judicial selection. Rhetoric
is an important weapon in this battle, as both sides seek to characterize
in the extreme the ideologies of the nominees whom they oppose. Each
side casts its nominees as being within the mainstream and many of the
other side's nominees as well outside of it. Republicans and Democrats
are vying to define the mainstream that they each can use as a yardstick
by which to measure the legitimacy of judicial ideologies. In short, they
are fighting to define the mainstream of American constitutional law.
The fight to define the mainstream of American constitutional law
coincides strikingly with unprecedented delays in the nomination and
confirmation phases of the judicial selection process. A recent report of
the Constitution Project indicates that the process for filling judicial
vacancies is taking longer than ever; the time for filling them has
increased from 38 days during the first two years of President Carter's
term to 226 days during the last two years of President Clinton's
("Judges and scholars perpetuate the myth of merit. The reality, however, is that every
appointment is political.").
46 See Constitution Project, Justice Held Hostage, at http://www.constitutionproject.
org/ci/reports/fedcourtupd.pdf (2002).
47 See GOLDMAN, supra note 21, at 307.
48 See Clinton's Judges, supra note 23, at 232-41.
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administration.49 The study further indicates a steady decline in the
percentage of a president's first-year nominations confirmed by the
Senate during that first year.50 The Senate confirmed 93% of President
Reagan's first-year judicial nominations in 1981. 51 In contrast, the
Senate confirmed only 44% of President George W. Bush's nominations
in 2001.52 In addition, in the first year of President George W. Bush's
administration the Senate took longer to confirm judges - an average of
112 days - from the earlier Senates under review, with the exception of
the first year of President Clinton's second term - an average of 133
days.53 The delays are due to various factors, including the change in
Senate leadership in mid-2001 as well as the fact that the Democrats
have been deferring Senate consideration of judicial nominations until
they have been reviewed by the ABA.54
In numerous other instances, presidents have not launched broad-
scale attacks on senatorial courtesy or challenged basic procedures, but
have breached norms in the course of choosing particular people to
nominate as federal judges. These breaches have given rise to the
conflicts discussed in the next section.
B. Mistakes in War
The most common source of conflicts over judicial selection involves
presidents' failures to follow or heed institutional norms or long-standing
expectations or practices. Presidents have numerous reasons for these
failures, though much more often than not, these failures can be traced
to the specific circumstances in which presidents choose, for political or
other reasons, to prioritize other short- or long-term objectives.
The first significant failure made by some presidents has been not
to consult with the senator(s) from their parties in the state in which the
judgeships they are trying to fill are located. The failure is almost
49 Constitution Project, supra note 43.
50 Id. at 6-7.
51 CONSTITUTION PROJECT, FIRST YEAR VACANCIES AND NOMINATIONS, at
http://www. constitutionproject.org/ci/reports/FirstYear.pdf, at 1 (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 The study further indicates, as I have previously suggested, that President
George W. Bush (to date) takes a shorter amount of time to make judicial nominations
than his three predecessors. On average, he nominated a candidate within 165 days of a
vacancy (or the date he took office), while the corresponding averages for Clinton's first
year was 253, for President George H.W. Bush's was 193, and for President Reagan's was
191. Of course, one major difference between President Bush and his three predecessors is
that he is the only one not to have allowed the ABA to rate the quality of the nominees
prior to their formally being nominated. The additional time required for the ABA to
provide its ratings accounts in part for both the quicker pace with which President Bush
makes nominations and the slower pace with which the Senate is considering them. Id.
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invariably fatal to a nomination's success, and surprisingly triggers
sanctions, not from senators from the opposition party, but from the
President's own party.
These sanctions have been applied, regardless of the President's
popularity. For instance, President Franklin Roosevelt was convinced
that senatorial courtesy was an antiquated concept65 and sometimes
ignored it to pursue other priorities, though in these instances with
virtually no success. For instance, in 1938, he nominated Floyd Roberts,
a New Deal supporter, to a federal district judgeship in Virginia.5 6 The
state's two Democratic senators were philosophically opposed to the New
Deal and thus to Roberts, while the state's governor, former governors,
and one influential congressman supported both the New Deal and
Roberts. The two senators effectively rallied other senators partly on the
ground of preserving the prerogative of senatorial courtesy and helped to
spearhead the Senate Judiciary Committee's rejection of the nomination
15-3 as well as the full Senate's defeat of the nomination 72-9. 57
Interestingly, President Roosevelt's subsequent strategy for filling
the judgeship paid homage to senatorial courtesy. Roosevelt offered the
judgeship to Armistead Dobie, then the dean of the University of
Virginia School of Law.58 Though Roosevelt had not consulted Virginia
senators in offering the position to Dobie, he nevertheless consulted with
them and got their approval before formally forwarding the nomination
to the Senate. With the senators on board, the nomination easily and
quickly was confirmed by the full Senate. 59
In 1943, President Roosevelt made an even bolder attempt to bypass
senatorial courtesy, which failed. He nominated James Allred to fill a
federal district judgeship in Texas.6° Allred had the support of one Texas
senator and other influential Democratic leaders in the state, but he also
ran unsuccessfully to unseat the other Texas senator, W. Lee O'Daniel.
Not surprisingly, O'Daniel vigorously opposed nominating his rival to fill
the judgeship, and the Judiciary Committee was split evenly on
recommending the nomination for the full Senate to consider. While
Allred asked at this point that his nomination be withdrawn, President
Truman was able later to appoint him as a federal judge after O'Daniel
left the Senate.6'
Though Harry Truman as a former senator should have understood
the importance of senatorial courtesy, he sometimes miscalculated and
55 See GOLDMAN, supra note 21, at 18-30.
56 Id. at 42-43.
57 Id.
5 Id. at 43-44.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 41-42.
61 Id.
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failed to take it adequately into account in making nominations. In one
flagrant failure, he failed to consult with Senator Richard Russell before
he nominated M. Neil Andrews to a federal district judgeship in
Georgia.62 Truman figured that he did not have to consult with Russell
on this appointment because he had already given Russell his due by
agreeing to another choice of Russell's for a different judicial vacancy in
his state. The problem was that Russell preferred a different candidate,
William Boyd Sloan, and thus vigorously opposed the Andrews
nomination. He initially helped to stall its consideration, causing
Truman to give Andrews a recess appointment, just as Roosevelt had
done with Roberts. Nevertheless, both the Judiciary Committee and the
full Senate voted to reject Andrews's nomination. While Truman was not
pleased with the rejection, he reluctantly agreed to nominate Sloan
instead to the judgeship, and the Senate quickly confirmed him.63
A second, major reason for frustrated or defeated judicial
nominations is poor timing. As Sheldon Goldman explains,
"Traditionally, minimal confirmation activity occurs during presidential
election years, especially when the Senate is controlled by one party and
the White House by another."64 Statistics amply demonstrate the
robustness of this basic norm. For instance, at the end of 2000, the
Senate had not acted on thirty-two district and eight circuit court
nominations that were pending at the end of the year.65 In 1992 the
Senate had not acted on forty-two district and five circuit court
nominations made by President Bush.66
Timing can make a big difference in judicial selection in a different
form: the pacing of the confirmation process. Over the years, senators
have developed numerous parliamentary and procedural mechanisms to
facilitate their input on judicial appointments. These include, but are not
limited to, individual senators' prerogatives to place any judicial
nominations temporarily on hold or filibuster. Nor are they limited to the
Judiciary Committee Chair's implied authority to control the scheduling
of hearings, numbers of witnesses, and timing of votes; or the majority
leader's authority to control everything that comes to the floor of the
Senate.67 The instances in which senators have used one or more of these
means to frustrate judicial nominations are legion. As one might expect,
senators employ these mechanisms for many reasons, including
62 Id. at 71-72.
63 Id.
64 Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 22, at 284.
65 Senate Republicans Continue to Criticize Democrats over Pace of Judicial
Confirmations, BULL. FRoNTRUNNER, Dec. 14, 2001.
66 Thomas L. Jipping, Why Were These Judges Approved?, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1,
1996, at Al.
67 See FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 7, at 135-79.
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protecting senatorial courtesy, rewarding friends, payback, logrolling,
and enforcing conceptions about the proper qualifications for judicial
appointments. Five examples dramatically illustrate the significance of
these mechanisms over time.68
First, in 1959, Lyndon Johnson became the first Senate Majority
Leader to stall all pending judicial nominations until the President
agreed to nominate his preferred candidate for a judgeship in Johnson's
home state.69 Johnson's strategy worked; the Senate confirmed Joe
Fisher three days after President Eisenhower nominated Johnson's
friend to the judgeship, and the logjam was broken.
Second, shortly after assuming the chairmanship of the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 1979, Ted Kennedy introduced several
innovations for judicial confirmation proceedings.70 He announced that
senators who withheld the "blue slips" of persons nominated for
judgeships from their states could no longer rely on the Chair to kill
those nominations. Kennedy directed that every nomination would be
discussed by the full Committee, and the Committee would determine
whether to proceed with a nomination by holding a hearing. In addition,
Kennedy arranged for the Committee to adopt a questionnaire that all
nominees would be required to complete and that, with the exception of a
few questions, would be made available to the public. The Committee
also began to routinely publish its confirmation proceedings. Moreover,
Kennedy invited various groups to testify before the Committee and to
rate judicial nominees. An especially important innovation was the
establishment of the Committee's own investigatory staff to examine the
backgrounds of judicial nominees apart from Justice Department
inquiries. 71
Third, as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Orrin
Hatch placed all judicial nominations on hold through the first half of
1999, both to wait for the completion of President Clinton's impeachment
trial in February 1999 and to have the President nominate his preferred
candidate, Ted Stewart, to a federal judgeship in his home state of Utah.
Eventually, Clinton and Hatch choreographed an exchange. 72 For his
part, President Clinton agreed to begin the vetting process for
nominating Stewart, while Hatch agreed that as long as Stewart
continued to progress through the appointments process, he would begin
to hold hearings on some pending nominations. 73 In October, the Senate
68 Id.
69 Id. at 141.
70 GOLDMAN, supra note 21 at 263.
71 Id.
72 FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 7, at 141.
73 Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at the Clinton Administrator's End, 19 LAW &
INEQ. 159, 176 (2001).
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confirmed Stewart, though most of the other pending nominations never
reached the floor of the Senate for a final vote.74
Fourth, the Judiciary Committee rejected both Pickering and Owen
by a strict party-line vote, and both rejections have intensified a vicious
cycle of payback.75 For instance, the vote on Pickering infuriated
Republicans, including President Bush and Pickering's sponsor Minority
Leader of the Senate, Trent Lott, both of whom had lobbied hard for the
judge's confirmation. By another vote strictly along party lines, the
Committee majority also rejected the President's and Senator Lott's
pleas to allow the nomination to be forwarded to the floor of the Senate
for a full vote.76 Lott appealed in vain to the Senate Majority Leader Tom
Daschle to intercede and forward the nomination to the Senate floor.
Both refusals to forward the nomination were not unusual, for Lott as
Majority Leader had consistently refused the same entreaties from
Daschle when their roles were reversed from 1994-2000.77 The Judiciary
Committee for decades had not forwarded to the floor a nomination that
a majority had refused to endorse. 78 Nevertheless, Republican senators
led by Trent Lott retaliated immediately through a series of
parliamentary maneuvers to impede other business in the Senate.79 Lott
also exacted revenge against Daschle by announcing that he would no
longer support Daschle's preferred candidate for a Democratic slot on the
Federal Communications Commission and thereby scuttled the
candidate's nomination.8 0
Fifth, since regaining control of the Senate in 2001, Democrats have
succeeded in slowing the pace of judicial confirmation proceedings. By
the end of 2001, the Senate had confirmed only twenty eight of President
Bush's eighty judicial nominations.81 Moreover, of President Bush's first
eleven circuit court nominations made in May of 2001, the Senate has
not held hearings, much less taken final action on eight of them,
including the following: legal scholar Michael McConnell, nominated by
President Bush to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; John
Roberts, nominated by President Bush to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
74 Dawn House, With "Hatch Express" Gone, Judiciary Crisis Hits Utah, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Dec. 27, 2001, at Al.
75 Jesse J. Holland, Democrats Reject Bush 5th Circuit Nominee, ADVOCATE, Sept. 6,
2002, at 2A.
76 Senate Rejects Pickering Nominee, BULL. FRONTRUNNER, Mar. 15, 2002.
77 See Clinton's Judges, supra note 23, at 235.
78 See Norm Theory, supra note 11, at 1715, n.23.
79 See James Brosnan, Federal Bench Nominees Left in Limbo; Bickering Curdles
Senate into Inaction, THE COM. APPEAL, Mar. 23, 2002, at Al.
80 FCC Briefs; Adelstein Nomination on Hold Again, 21 FCC REP. 19, Sept. 20,
2002.
s1 David G. Savage, Judicial Nominees Go 28 for 80 in the Senate, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
31, 2001, at Al.
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the District of Columbia (almost a decade after the Senate had failed to
act on his nomination to the same court by President George H.W.
Bush); and Carolyn Kyl, nominated by President Bush to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 82 Twenty-two circuit nominations are
pending before the Committee, and President Bush has yet to nominate
people for nine other vacancies on the federal courts of appeals. 3
Michigan's two Democratic senators have put holds on all three of the
President's nominees to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in retaliation against the Republicans' fatal holds on two Democratic
nominees to the same court.84 Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, the
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has explained that the delays
are, to some extent, due to the need to handle other priorities including
anti-terrorist legislation. Republicans charge that the delays are
attributable primarily to the preferences of Committee Democrats for
liberal activist judges and hostility to qualified conservative judicial
nominees. Other observers suggest that the delays are payback for the
Republicans' delays of many of President Clinton's judicial
nominations,8 5 including forty at the end of his administration.8 6
As these and many other examples amply illustrate, senators'
opposition or resistance to judicial nominees is attributable to many
different reasons, including, but not limited to, doubts in many instances
about the nominees' qualifications. To be sure, there has never been any
consensus in the Senate on the minimal qualifications for federal judges.
Nor has there been any meaningful agreement in recent years on
whether there is some objective measure of judicial qualifications. The
one major exception is that senators over the years have insisted that
judicial nominees have, inter alia, the requisite integrity to serve as
federal judges. Hence, nominees' ethical lapses are a frequently cited
basis for rejecting or opposing many judicial nominations.8 7
Other common questions that have arisen about nominees'
qualifications relate to their trial practice (particularly for district
judges), temperament, participation in activities unsuitable for judges
(such as membership in discriminatory clubs), and judicial philosophy.
Three dramatic illustrations of these concerns in practice are (1) the
Senate Judiciary Committee's close vote on and the Senate's eventual
82 Courting Tension Statistics Don't Tell the Whole Story of Judicial Nominations
Fight, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 24, 2001, at 31.
83 Adam Nagourney, Economy Stirs G.O.P. Worry in the White House Races, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2002, at Al.
84 John Nowacki, Leahy Presides over Judicial Vacancy Crisis, INSIGHT ON THE
NEWS, June 3, 2002, at 46.
85 Norm Theory, supra note 11, at 1706-09.
86 See Savage, supra note 81 (citing Professor Sheldon Goldman).
87 See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 21.
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confirmation of former Connecticut Governor Thomas Meskill, whom
President Nixon initially nominated and President Ford renominated to
the Second Circuit in spite of the ABA's rating of him as "not qualified";88
(2) the forced withdrawal of President Reagan's nomination of former
Louisiana Governor David Treen to the Fifth Circuit based on his past
participation in the segregationist Louisiana States' Rights Party;8 9 and
(3) the Judiciary Committee's negative vote on President Reagan's
nomination of Jeff Sessions to a federal district judgeship in Alabama
and split vote on forwarding it to the Senate floor, effectively killing it,
based on several racially insensitive statements made by Sessions.90
IV. AcHIEvING PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
Achieving peaceful coexistence throughout the phases of judicial
selection is not easy, particularly in times of divided government. Even
when the same party controls both the White House and the Senate,
peaceful coexistence is hard to achieve. In the first years of their
respective presidencies, Woodrow Wilson and Bill Clinton both endured
tense relations with their fellow Democrats for the same basic reason:
each became the first Democratic president after relatively long periods
in which the other party had occupied the White House, sixteen for
Wilson and twelve for Clinton. Thus, from the outset of these
presidencies, many Democratic senators felt that they were long overdue
in having their preferred candidates fill the vacant judgeships in their
respective states.91 Clinton's difficulties clearly extended to the selection
of Supreme Court justices, so that, even though Democrats controlled the
Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate, he did not want to expend
precious political coinage in defending his nominees in protracted
confirmation proceedings rather than on legislative priorities.92
Presidents have pursued at least three strategies to deal with the
difficulties in achieving peaceful coexistence in judicial selection. The
first is simply to abdicate presidential authority in choosing nominees
and defer almost completely to senators' preferences. Such deference was
relatively common throughout the nineteenth century, particularly when
8 Deborah Pines, New Chief Judge Meskill Won Them Over, N.Y.L.J., June 29,
1992, at 1. Note that this close vote lead the Ford administration to avoid thereafter
nominating other people rated by the ABA as "not qualified" to federal judgeships.
89 Richard Connelly, New Voices Divide Court That Desegregated South, LEGAL
TIMES, May 30, 1988, at 30.
90 Philip Hager, Panel's Action Only Second Such Turndown in Forty-nine Years:
Reagan Judicial Nominee Rejected, L.A. TIMEs, June 6, 1986, at 4.
91 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Confirmation Mystery, 83 GEO. L.J. 395, 410 n.73
(1994) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS (1994)); FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 7,
at 98-99.
92 Clinton's Judges, supra note 23, at 237.
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the same party controlled the White House and the Senate, and judicial
nominations were made on the basis of party affiliation and activity.9
In the twentieth century, the President who came closest to
complete abdication was Warren G. Harding.9 4 Indeed, the Republican
party establishment backed Harding as President, in part because it
believed he would accede to its preferences for lower-court judicial
nominees and other important appointments. As President, Harding
made clear from the outset his desire to return to "normalcy," which, in
the area of judicial selection, meant granting to the senators from his
party their preferred choices to fill the judgeships in their respective
states.
A second strategy is to accept, perhaps even to invite, some conflict
over judicial appointments to demonstrate the President's strength and
to define both the President and his enemies through such conflicts.
Perhaps the best or most dramatic example of a nineteenth-century
president who followed this strategy was Andrew Jackson.95 The clearest
example in the twentieth century is William Howard Taft.96 Ronald
Reagan 97 and George W. Bush98 have followed this strategy as well.
A third strategy falls between these other two strategies. It entails
negotiating and otherwise coordinating or managing the governing
norms of judicial selection to achieve or maintain relatively peaceful
coexistence. Negotiations between presidents and senators have
produced many different arrangements. The first arrangement is the
creation of new judgeships over which presidents have greater latitude
to fill - used, for example, by President Carter to appoint people from
under-represented groups without taking opportunities away from
established constituencies. 99 Another arrangement is senators' providing
93 Kermit Hall comprehensively examines the patterns of judicial appointments in
the 19th century. He notes, for example, that Martin Van Buren's judicial appointments
were "more party directed than [those made] during Jackson's administration." HALL,
supra note 19, at 29. Van Buren made 17 lower-court nominations; and, unlike Jackson's,
Van Buren's nominees, with only one exception, met no opposition in the Senate. Id.
Similarly, in making ten lower-court judicial appointments as president, Zachary Taylor
"wielded ... judicial patronage in an outwardly party-directed fashion." Id. at 90. The same
was true later in the century for Republican presidents Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur; and
Grover Cleveland based all thirty-four of his lower-court appointments on party
considerations. FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 7, at 129-30.
94 See HARRIS, supra note 31.
95 HALL, supra note 19, at 1-26.
96 See FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 7, at 100.
97 See GOLDMAN, supra note 21, at 285-319.
98 Amy Goldstein, Bush Blasts Democrats for Lagging on Judicial Nominees, WASH.
POST, May 4, 2002, at A04; Amy Goldstein White House Pushing Harder to Confirm
Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2002, at A06; Stewart M. Powell, Bush Goes to Mat for
Judicial Nominee, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 7, 2002, at A3.
99 See, e.g., Clinton's Judges, supra note 23, at 243-52.
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lists of names of acceptable candidates chosen pursuant to criteria set
forth by an administration, a practice used during President Reagan's
first term with mixed success. 100 A third arrangement allows states with
senators from both parties to alternate in making recommendations to
the President, variations of which were used by New York's senators
from the 1970s through the 1990s101 as well as by Washington's two
senators from 1997 until the end of the Clinton administration.10 2 A final
arrangement involves making a trade in which a senator gets his or her
preference for a judicial appointment on a court in exchange for the
President's getting his preferred candidate appointed to the same or
some other court. This strategy was employed, for instance, by President
Clinton and Washington's Senator Slade Gorton to fill two pending
vacancies on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 03
Some negotiations between presidents and senators are more visible
than others, and the degree or extent of visibility is a factor in their
success. For instance, President Dwight Eisenhower, who generally
preferred to operate through a hidden hand,10 4 set the guiding principles
for judicial selection and charged the Justice Department with the
responsibility for implementing them. His staff largely insulated him
from the political pressures of the process. In practice, this meant that
the Justice Department became "the locus of dealing with members of
Congress,"'1 5 and neither Eisenhower nor his Justice Department ever
directly challenged the Senate. Hence, the Senate did not reject any of
his nominees. To be sure, there were conflicts, and Eisenhower could be
embarrassed or coerced into accepting a senator's preference, as he was
with Lyndon Johnson in 1959. Yet, senators from both parties quickly
100 President Reagan cut a deal with the Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and
the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee Strom Thurmond "to give the administration
more flexibility in naming district judges while retaining senatorial influence." GOLDMAN,
supra note 21, at 287-88. The plan was for Republican senators to provide the President
with a list of three to five names for each judicial vacancy to be filled in their respective
states. The recommendations were to be made pursuant to criteria set forth by the
administration. While the plan was successfully implemented early in Reagan's presidency,
it eventually fell apart. Some Republican senators chafed from the outset at having to meet
any selection criteria and went back to recommending to the President only a single name
for each vacancy in their states, while the slate of people recommended by other senators
became meaningless because they simply signaled their top preferences through other
channels. Id. at 288-90.
101 Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirmations in the Era of
Hatch and Loft, 103 DICK. L. REV. 247, 299 (1999).
102 See Norm Theory, supra note 11, at 1710 n.82.
103 FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 7, at 140.
104 See generally FRED GREENSTEIN, THE HIDDEN HAND PRESIDENCY (Johns Hopkins
ed. 1994).
105 GOLDMAN, supra note 21, at 131.
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came to realize and accept that most trading occurs below radar and
thus without public awareness or scrutiny.'O
In contrast, Bill Clinton's negotiations with senators often became
public, and the more public they became, the more it became a liability
for President Clinton and his nominees.1 07 President Clinton's initial
strategy was to avoid any public fights over judicial nominees. His
thinking was that the fewer high-profile contests, the less likely
campaigns would be waged for and against nominees for the sake of
scoring political points. In other words, lowering the visibility of the
judicial selection process helped to depoliticize it, because this strategy
would increase the likelihood of a more professional, less politically
explosive negotiation over the merits of particular appointments. Indeed,
President Clinton and his advisers invested less in nominating
particular people than in nominating particular kinds of people. Their
objective, which they believe they largely achieved, was to improve the
quality and diversity of judicial appointments. They viewed many
prospective candidates as fungible, so that they could gravitate away
from the candidates likely to promise trouble and towards those that
seemed to hold greater promise of relatively easy confirmation.
President Clinton's strategy and its implementation came at a price,
though it did culminate in only one judicial nominee, Ronnie White,
being rejected by the Senate. 108 First, the strategy contained the seeds of
its own unraveling. Clinton's hope to avoid high-profile contests over
judicial appointments merely signaled to opposition senators that they
were likely to prevail in any contest, as long as they signaled their
willingness to wage a highly visible campaign against a nominee. Once
Clinton backed down early in his presidency when faced with such
threats, he signaled the effectiveness of making the threat to wage a
protracted, visible contest over a judicial appointment. Thus, senators
recognized that the greatest leverage they had in negotiating with
Clinton over prospective nominees was threatening to make a public
contest, thus forcing the President to decide whether he wanted to
expend his political capital in such a fight.10 9
Second, the bargaining phase of President Clinton's judicial
selection entailed an entirely new approach in the pre-nomination phase
of judicial selection. President Clinton and others began to see a perverse
advantage to publicizing the pre-nomination phase of the process. While
this practice helped the administration to settle on relatively strong
106 Id.
107 See generally FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS, supra note 7.
108 For the story of the confirmation contest over White's nomination, see Clinton's
Judges, supra note 23, at 239-41.
109 Id.
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nominees for many judgeships, it subjected many people to public
evisceration. Indeed, the floating of possible candidates for judgeships
became a substitute for the confirmation process, for the administration
would often make choices of nominees based on the extent to which they
could survive such public vetting. Senators and interest groups figured
that they could influence the choices of possible nominees by quickly and
publicly condemning or promoting certain nominees. In time, a relatively
unseemly process evolved in which negotiations over nominees no longer
occurred behind closed doors, as it had during the Eisenhower
administration, but rather in newspapers and other public forums.
Third, President Clinton's bargaining was further complicated by
his impeachment and other legislative priorities. Clinton needed to
bargain in order to maintain or cultivate political support for other
important initiatives, including his own survival in office. As a practical
matter, this meant that he was often bargaining from a position of
weakness or that his nominees, once nominated, could not rely solely on
him for their success, and thus languished when he had to expend his
political coinage on other matters. As Sheldon Goldman reports,
Republican staffers acknowledged that one important reason many of
Clinton's judicial nominees languished in his final year in office is that
no one, not even Clinton, seemed willing to expend any efforts to get
them hearings, much less floor votes.11 0
Interestingly, one tactic that helped Clinton and other presidents in
the past - but notably not President George W. Bush in fighting for
either Pickering or Owen - is to take the initiative in making and
fighting on behalf of a high-profile nomination. This tactic is extremely
important for avoiding submission, like that of President Harding. It has
been used effectively by many presidents to clarify early on what they
want in exchange for trading, as well as the preferences over which they
will fight. Even though President Reagan clearly set the appointment of
conservatives to the lower courts as a major priority of his
administration, he picked his fights carefully."' Despite the
extraordinary extent to which Reagan based his nominations on
ideological rather than partisan concerns, Sheldon Goldman notes, "A
characteristic of judicial selection during Reagan's first term was the
apparent reluctance to engage in a confirmation fight in the Senate even
if it meant sacrificing a philosophically desirable candidate .... ,,112
Moreover, President Reagan was careful not to nominate people to the
110 Id. at 237-38.
III See GOLDMAN, supra note 21, at 286-96. Of course, there were some high-profile
contests over some judicial nominations. The administration was apparently willing to
fight over some but not other nominees because of the strength of the nominees' likely
political backing or because it was trying to effectuate or implement a deal or trade. Id.
112 Id. at 299-300.
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courts of appeals unless he or his team was satisfied "that the nominee
shared the administration's judicial philosophy. When a potential
nominee had strong political backing but doubts were raised about the
candidate's philosophical reliability, the burden was on the candidate's
backers to demonstrate that the doubts were unfounded."113 This
approach reflected respect for senatorial courtesy and negotiating, while
preserving and underscoring President Reagan's basic commitment to
making judicial appointments a high-profile priority of his
administration. President Reagan's willingness to use his popularity to
fight for his nominees provided formidable leverage on their behalf,
although it coincided significantly with his party's control of the Senate.
Both Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt were
as interested in their judicial nominees' philosophy as President Reagan
was. But they often engaged in trading or deals to consolidate party
support and to promote their domestic agendas, particularly during
times of war. 114 Lincoln was notorious for employing patronage to secure
support for party unity as well as his domestic agenda. 1 5 This practice is
especially evident with his six Supreme Court appointments, all of which
were made with significant input by party and Senate leaders.116
113 Id. at 305.
114 Lincoln's deference was not, however, automatic or extreme; it was usually based
on each side getting something out the appointment. Lincoln's Supreme Court
appointments would prove to be different only in degree, not in kind, from the other
appointments he made as president. Consequently, he generally deferred to congressional
leaders on the candidates for filling vacancies with the primary condition that they met
criteria set forth for their selection by the President. In all six appointments he made to the
Court, Lincoln faced no serious conflict with senators but instead was able to find nominees
agreeable to Republican leaders each time. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting Presidential
Performance in the Federal Appointments Process in Perspective, 47 CASE W. RES. L. Rev.
1359, 1368-72 (1997).
Franklin D. Roosevelt is a second example of a president adept at employing
institutional norms to get his way. When he finally got an opportunity to fill a vacancy on
the Court, it did not happen until the beginning of his second term. When the vacancy
finally arose in 1937, it proved to be a pivotal one, for the retiring justice was one of the
most ardent opponents to constitutional foundations of the New Deal - Willis Van
DeVanter. There was no question there would be a fight, because the appointment, if
confirmed, would produce for the first time in the Courts history a critical mass of justices
who opposed economic due process and supported greater judicial deference to
congressional exercises of its Commerce Clause power. Roosevelt was not interested in a
compromise. His nomination proved to be surprising not because he turned to a senator or
an ardent supporter of the New Deal but rather he turned to someone who, as a senator,
had not been known as a great constitutional thinker (like Sutherland) but as an ardent
partisan. The views of his nominee, Hugo Black, were well known to his colleagues in the
Senate, but the powerful norm of senatorial deference to the nomination of a colleague to
the Court worked in Black's favor and led many senators who might have opposed him
otherwise to accept his nomination begrudgingly. See GOLDMAN, supra note 21, at 15-64.
115 See generally DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN RECONSIDERED (1980).
116 See Gerhardt, supra note 27, at 405-06.
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Similarly, Franklin Roosevelt was acutely sensitive to prospective
nominees' political backing throughout his presidency, particularly
during World War II. As Sheldon Goldman further observes, "When the
political backing was exceptionally strong and there were questions
raised as to the candidate's fidelity to the New Deal, the benefit of the
doubt was often given to the candidate."'117 Roosevelt's willingness to
compromise derived from his recognition of the long-term benefits of
agreeing to a particular senator's choices, and so he would often consider
the impact his choice of a nominee would have on a senator's support for
his administration. 118
As the Lincoln and Roosevelt examples illustrate, a great deal
depends on the popularity of the war during which judicial selection
takes place. Only a few presidents have made Supreme Court
nominations in times of war, two of which were fighting for a cause
popular with most senators - Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D.
Roosevelt. The point at which Roosevelt's approach to Supreme Court
selection most closely resembled Lincoln's was the 1940s, the period in
which the nation formally entered the Second World War. In these years,
Roosevelt's nominees were Jimmy Byrnes in June 1941, Harlan Fiske
Stone as Chief Justice also in June 1941, the day on which the Senate
confirmed Byrnes, and Wiley Rutledge in February 1943.119 Byrnes was
a former senator and thus able to take advantage of senatorial courtesy.
Stone was a Republican whose nomination bespoke of bipartisanship and
a desire on the part of the President to put aside party differences as
best he could under the circumstances. Rutledge was a relatively
inoffensive nominee whom most senators did not know or take the time
to know.12o
Other presidents who have made judicial nominations in times of
war include President Truman during the Korean War and Presidents
Johnson and Nixon during the Vietnam War. They did not receive any
special deference simply because their nominations coincided with an
ongoing military conflict. One possible reason that none received special
deference is that neither the Korean War nor the Vietnam conflict was
popular, especially over time, with the American people. Another
plausible reason they received no special deference is that senators drew
a distinction between domestic and foreign policy, and thus their support
for the latter did not have any effect on their support for the former.
117 GOLDMAN, supra note 21, at 33.
118 Id. at 41.
119 See id. at 15-64.
120 Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
War is not inevitable in federal judicial selection. It can be avoided
if national political leaders choose to follow the institutional norms that
they have developed over the years to guide the appointments process.
War breaks out when national political leaders, particularly presidents,
breach these norms.
Because war is, in von Clausewitz's famous judgment, an extension
of politics, one is left to wonder about the politics or motives driving
combat over judicial appointments. 121 In considering the reasons for
combat, I cannot help but recall a question raised by Winston Churchill
in the midst of World War II. When asked whether the East End of
London should be shut down and theater productions stopped because of
the bombing of the city, Churchill is attributed with responding: "No.
What . . . do you think we are fighting for?' As combats erupt over
judicial appointments, it is useful to ask, in a similar vein, "What are
each of the sides fighting for, and what do these contests tell us about
them and, more importantly, about our values?'
121 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds., 1976).
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